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Nature of the case 
Plairirltf brought an action for specific performance to acquire 
the f.e·-ii··. Rar.ch. He claimed prior to trial that there was an agree-
ment which cnntained an Option and which Option he exercised. 
Plaintiff claimed that there was no agreement but merely an outstand-
ing counteroffer which the Plaintiff never accepted. 
Disposition of the Lower Court 
This case was heard before Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District 
Judge of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County, 
State of Utah, who impaneled an advisory jury, adopted the jury's 
answers to Special Intercogatories and granted a Judgment and 
Decree of Specific Performance. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Defendant Lewis seeks a reversal of the Judgment and Decree 
or, in the alternative, a Decision of this Court granting Defendant 
a New Trial. 
Statement of the Facts 
A written Option Agreement was prepared for Plaintiff- Responr 
Trees by a St. George attorney, Steven Snow. Attorney Snow signed 
the agreemer.t as "Attorney in Fact" for plaintiff Trees after whid 
it wes presented by d real estate agGnt, Michael Hatch, to Defendar 
Appellant Lewis st the Chicago Airport on December 4, 1980, about 1 
year before Defendant Lewis expected to retire and return to Utah 
to live. Hatch worked for Deseret Realty which was owned by Real 
Estate Agent, Earl Milne and his wife. The Option Agreement perta' 
to the purchase and sale of the 160 acre Lewis Ranch which abuts 
Zion National Park near Springdale, Utah. 
The ranch is in a basically non-accessible area but has therec 
an hist:Jrical old home known es the Shunesbe::g Mansion, a res;_denc; 
a guest house, a small lake, a swimming pool, with water rights anc 
although basically non-productive was a refuge for Defendant Lewis 
who spent his summer and often his Christmas vacations there as 
well as visiting on other occasions and who looked forward to his 
retirement so that he could use and enjoy the ranch. He acquired 
it after the death of his brother who owned it and lived there for 
many years. Lewis did not desire to sell the ranch having turned 
down several offers and not having ever listed it for sale. His 
wife had some physical health problems and since there was no phon< 
or electricity at the Rach, he did not like to leave her there alor 
He had a lot in Springdale on which he intended to build a home. 
never at any time set a purchase price, the price in this instance 
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having been one offered by the Plaintiff. James F. Trees, who 
resided in New York, contacted real estate agent, Earl Milne, 
described ~het tvpe of property he was interested in finding; flew 
nver the le11i~ ranch and other property in the area and hired Milne 
and/or his compHny to acquire property or options on property, and 
Trees agreed to pay all real estate fees in connection with any 
purchase. Agent Milne contacted Lewis who made it clear to Milne 
and to plaintiff Trees that Lewis did not desire to sell the 
ranch. Lewis had several conditions primary of which was retaining 
60-day visitation rights in the summer and other visitation rights 
to hike and move about the ranch. He desired that the buyer be a 
person with whom he could have a good relationship so that he could 
enjoy his visitation rights, monitor projects which were going on, 
mal-.e a contribution to the overall condition of the ranch and 
preservation of the area and the historical backgro~nd and history 
of the ranch, and that the buyer be willing to make a gift or 
donation to BYU. 
Trees visited BYU to see if he approved of the school, which 
he did. Efforts were made with BYU to handle the transaction so 
that BYU would obtain part of the sales price as a gift or donation 
but that ef:ort failed because of tax law complications. 
The Option Agreement contained, inter alia, two important 
provisions, both of which are found in paragraph 12 of the Agreement: 
i:. (First) This document is intended as the final and exclusive 
agreement of the parties, and all other agreements related 
to this property, between these parties are superseded 
hereby and merged herein. (Second) This document may not 
be amended, modified or revoked unless by a writing signed 
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by the parti..es. (The words "First" and ''Second" have 
been added for purposes of emphasis) 
The Option Agreement, Exhibi.t 5 and entitled ''Real Estate 
Option" made no mention whatsoever of App!?llant Lewis' retained 
Yisitati.on r:!6hts, and Lewis was appalh•d when he ft)und no ment 
of visitation rights in the Option Agreem~nt, particularly in i 
of the exclusion e.nd m1!rger clause set forth in pare graph 12. 
had little experience :'..n land transactions, and none with 0ptior 
However, he di.d refuse to !:ign until there was added to the bott 
of the Option Agreement the follow!'.ng: 
Additionally, it is understood that there exists an 
agreement between optionee and optionor for mutually 
agreeable visitation rights for optionor. 
Further, paragraph 9 was amended relative to the prepe.yment pen1 
.clause. After these changes were penned in, at the airport, on: 
then did Lewis sign the Option Agreement. 
At this point, the Option Agreement becamt! a "Counteroffer' 
and will be referred to as such hereafter, except as otherwise 
noted. The Counteroffer was never accepted in writing as requi1 
by paragraph 12 (or otherwise) by either Attorney in Fact Snow 1 
the Plaintiff, Trees. 
The Counteroffer was signed by Lewis on the 4th day of 
December, 1980. Thirteen days later on December 17, 1980, Lew: 
drafted an "AGREEMENT" between himself and Trees which provided 
that there was an agreement between the parties wherein Lewis 
retains certain visitation rights for the remainde~ of his life 
which includes 60-days annual "in residence" at the ranch and 
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the opJ.Hirtun i ty to vis it, move, ride, hike, and moniter projects on 
che property at: other times. Lewis signed the Agreement (Exhibit 14) 
and o>ent ic t.•.' Agent Hatch, together with a covering letter (Exhibit 
15) requesting Hatch to have Trees sign the Agreement and retu~n a 
signed copy to him. 
The Counteroffer required the option set forth therein to be 
exercised on or before December 31, 1980. Because of problems 
Trees was having with regard to the purchase by him of DeMille 
property which abutted a part of the Lewis ranch, Trees, through 
Attorney Snow asked for and received extensions of time to and 
including the 30th day of May, 1981, in which to exercise the 
Counteroffer. 
On or about the 27th of May, 1981, Lewis was informed by Trees 
that he was exercising his option to purchase the ranch. When 
Lewis asked about his visitation rights, and told Trees he had no 
option until Lewis received his write-up on his visitation rights, 
Trees replied that Lewis had no visitation rights, no 60-day visita-
tion rights, and that Trees did not have any information about 
them. Whereupon Lewis told him to call Hatch. Trees said that he 
would and that he would call Lewis back. Trees immediately contacted 
Attorney Snow and for the first time became aware of the agreement 
dated December 17, Plaintiff's Exhibit 15. On May 29, Trees sent a 
letter to Lewis which had been dictated to Trees by Attorney Snow 
which stated: "In accordance with the terms of our contract and 
the exten8ions thereof, I hereby exercise my option to purchase 
T:he ~Jroperty in Utah .... " The letter does not mention the 
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December 17th Agreement nor does it mer:tion visitation rights at a 
Approximately fourteen days later, following Lewis' consultat 
with an attorney, the attorney for Lewis delivered a letter dated 
June 12, 1981, to attorney Snow withdrawing the Counteroffer and 
stating that the parties were not in agreement. Exhibits 16, a 
handwritten letter, and 49, a typed copy of the handwritten letter 
During the next ten days, Trees had Milne present to Lewis 
a letter form agreement,and an Agreement, both signed by Snow as 
Attorney in Fact for Trees, one dated June 19, 1981, the other 
dated June 23, 1981. The letter agreement extended some visitatic 
privileges which consisted of an invitation to Lewis as a friend c 
Trees and based upon guest privileges to visit and temporarily 
remain as a guest on the property, provided Trees or other guests 
were not on the property and further provided that arrangements 
must be made and approved by Trees prior to any visit; it did not 
bind his heirs and assigns. The Agreement of June 23 acknowledgei 
that Lewis had certain visitation rights but limited them to hike 
or ride horseback through the property, subject to receiving permi 
in advance for each visit, but did not provide for any in-residenc 
of any kind. These letters are designated Exhibits 28 and 29, 
respectively, both of which were excluded by the Coui:t at trial a1 
offers of settlement. Trees did not sign either of them either 
letter although each contained a line for his signature. Notwit; 
standing the foregoing, Trees testified at trial that he had 
always been willing to grant the visitation set forth by Lewis, 
including the specific visitation set forth in the December 17 
A 11 f'BY'Il<""t s tendered by Trees had been by check and none were 
cashRd and all checks were returned immediately following the 
withdrawal of the Counteroffer. Lewis told Snow that he did not 
want checks sent to him! Finally Snow honored Lewis' request and 
stopped sending checks. 
This case was tried with an advisory jury with the Court 
adopting the Findings or Verdict of the jury. 
Additional Facts are hereafter set forth. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COUNTEROFFER WAS 
NEVER ACCEPTED. 
The Jury found that the document entitled Real Estate Option 
dated November 5, 1980, as amended before signing by Lewis to 
provide for visitation rights together with the December 17 Agreement 
which spelled out the visitation rights constituted a Counteroffer. 
Trees rejected that Counteroffer. The Counteroffer had to be signed 
by Trees as required by the Option in paragraph 12. Neither the 
Option of December 5 as amended nor the December 17th Agreement was 
signed by Trees or his attorney in fact Snow. In addition, in the 
tPlephone conversation on May 27 when Trees said he was exercising 
his •)ption he testified, T. Vol I, p. 171" 
. And then he (Lewis) blurted out, "Where are the rights 
for my 60-day rights?" And I didn't know anything about his 
60-day rights. And I said, "Walter, you have no rights, 60-
day rights. What are you talking about?" And he .;aid, "You 
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call Mike Hatch, he knows." And I said, "Okay, I'll call 
Mike Hatch and then he'll call you right back or I'll call 
you right back. That was the conversation basically. 
Trees thought to himself "Oh my God, Walter is overreaching." 
Neither Trees nor Hatch ever called changing the rej1~ction of the 
Counteroffer. 
The power cf acceptance created by an offer or counteroffer ! 
terminated by communicated rejection of t~e offer, and it makes nc 
difference that a time period has been given for accepting the 
offer or counteroffer or that the offer or counteroffer requires 
acceptance thereof in writing. I Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 94. P. 
389 (1963). Trautwein v. Leavy, 472 P.2d 776 (Wyo.) (1970) 
Having lost the power to accept, the Plaintiff no longer had 
power to accept and could not accept thereafter in the absence of 
Lewis again reaffirming the offer, which he did not do. Although 
he probably would have done so prior to withdrawing the counterof 
provided Trees had signed and de livered to him a copy of the Decer 
17 Agreement, T. Vol 1, p. 107. 
Trees knew of the residency requirement prerequisite insiste' 
on by Lewis in all negotiations. Even though he had not seen the 
December 17th Agreement when he rejected the counteroffer, he kne1 
of the residency requirement as he had received a letter dated 
December 6, 1980, the day after the counteroffer was made by Lewi 
addressed to the Superintendant of Zions National Park wherein 
Lewis pointed out that he was going to maintain some involvement 
and part time residency in the ranch during his life time. Exhib 
12. Further, he had ample time to change his rejection if he 
r1£s ired v> d•) so. He did not. On May 29, he wrote a letter to 
T,ewis whPrein he srated, "In accordance with the terms of our 
cunt oict and extent ions thereof I hereby exercise my option to 
purchase the property in Utah." Attorney Snow dictated that letter. 
He undoubtedly knew that matters dealing with rights in land had to 
b"' in writing in order to comply with our Statute of Frauds Title 
25 Chapter 5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, an amended, and that the 
reservation of rights in the ranch for visitation purposes required 
compliance with Chapter 5 and particularly Section 1. There was no 
other collateral visitation document in writing supporting the Dec-
ember 17 Agreement until the June 19 and June 23 Agreement which 
which were after the time of the withdrawal of the Counteroffer. 
The case of R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child 247 P2d 17, (Utah) 
(1952), recognizes that the Plaintiff in a Specific Performance 
case has the burden of proof and that a reply or offer perporting 
to accept an offer but which adds a qualification or requires 
performance of conditions is not an acceptance but a Counteroffer. 
Further, in the case of Specific Performance, the burden of 
proof on the Plaintiff is strong. This ls pointed out in the case 
of Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 423 P2d 491 (Utah) (1967), wherein this 
Court approvingly cites the 1946 Colorado Case of Bowman vs. Reyburn, 
170 P2d 271 where it is said by a unanimous Court at page 276 as follow! 
In an action for Specific Performance, a contract 
must be free from ambiguity and it must be clearly 
es~.ablished that the demand and performance is in accord-
ance with the actual agreement of the parties (Citations 
•1mi L Led), 'a greater degree of certainty ls required in the 
terms of an agreement, which is to be specifically executed in 
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equity, than is necessary in a contract which is to be the 
basis of an action at law for dnma~es', Porneroys Specific 
Performance of Contracts, 3d Ed., ~159, in Ward vs. Ward, 94 
Co. 275 30 Pd 853, also in Mestas vs. Martinr-;--113 Col. 108, 
155 Pd 161. ' There i.s no better estabished principle of 
equity jnrisprudence than that Specific: Performance will not 
be decreed whE·n the contract is imcomplete, uncertain or 
indefina.te.' Dodg~_Jl_:ros. vs. Williams Estate Co., 52 Nev. 36 
287 p 282, 28~ ..... . 
It would seem to fellow that in this case of a Counteroffer. This 
burden fell on the Plaintiff, in view of the foregoing, to spell 
cut in his May 29 letter that he was accepting the Counteroffer, o 
that he was accepting the "Contract" as amended by Lewis and as 
amended by the December 17 Agreement. For, in fact, there was no 
"Contract" only an outstanding Counteroffer. The letter assumes a 
"Contract" and does not accept a Countercf fer but states I hereby 
exercise my option". It assumes a contract existed. Further, 
the silence of Trees left his oral rejection of the counteroffer 
very much in effect, for silence is not to be deemed an acceptance 
Kimball Elevator Co. vs. elevator Supplies Co., 272 P2d 583 (Utah) 
(1954). 
The Plaintiff had the burden of proof in this case which he d 
not sustain. Also, the Option Agreement of December 4 was drawn b 
Attorney Snow and signed by him as attorney-in-fact and he dictate 
the May 29 Agreement, and to t'l-.at extent he is "a pa::-ty" to the 
documents; he had knowledge of the December 17 Agreement shortly 
after its signing by Lewis. An instrument is to be construed 
against the person that draws it, and this is particularly true 
where the attorney is a party. It is submitted that the same is 
basically true where the attorney is the attorney-in-fact as well 
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as the attorney for the individual for whom he draws documents, and 
the same should be construed against him and his client. Continental 
Bank and Trust Co. vs. Bybee, 306 Specific Second 773 (Utah) (1957). 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE 
MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
It is obvious from the foregoing argument in Point I that 
there was inter alia no meeting of the minds between Lewis and 
Trees. That conclusion is further supported by the Agreement of June 
19 and June 23 signed by his attorney-in-fact relating to visitation 
provisions. As noted, the June 19 letter agreement was an "invitation" 
"based on friendship" and offered as "privileges" to Lewis and his 
immediate f.amily. The Agreement of June 23 reads as follows: 
AGREEMENT 
During his lifetime, Walter Lewis shall retain certain 
visitation rights to hike or horseback ride through the 
property. 
Mr. Lewis shall have the right to invite a few of his 
close friends or family members to accompany him. 
Mr. Lewis shall notify Mr. Trees or his foreman con-
cerning these visits and shall receive permission in advance 
for each visit. 
This agreement shall be ~inding on the heirs, assigns, 
and successors in interest of James F. Trees. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1981. 
It provides for no residency, 60-day or otherwise. It requires 
advance permission. However, the rights retained by Lewis in his 
December 17 Agreement are specific and clear: 
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AGREEMENT 
As part of the contract for sale of certain properties 
by Walter M. Lewis to James F. Trees, there exists an agreea 
between the parties that Lew~s retains certain visitation 
rig'."its during the remainder of his 1.i.fe, end may invite fami! 
and friends to accompany him. These rights include: 
60 days annually :Jf ''in rt,sidence' at the ranch 
house, the dates to be arranged by each party endeav-
oring to min;.mally inconvenience the other. 
The opportunity to visit or move through the prope1 
ties at other times to ride or hike to remote points 
ot to monitor projects, provided that precaution is 
always taken not to invade the pri·..racy of Trees. 
This agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, administri 
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
This agreement recognizes what gentlemen would and ought to do in 
close situation as was contemplated by the parties in that in-res' 
provision required that "each party endeavoring to minimally incor 
venience the other." It does not say a party shall not or cannot 
but is consistant with the language that they endeavor not to 
interfer. It is somewhat stronger with regard to other visitaitor 
in that "precaution" is to be taken not to invade the privacy of 
Trees. Again this is what gentlemen or neighbors with good feeU 
toward each other would do, but here again it is not a prohabitim 
and it does not require first obtaining the consent of Trees or h 
foreman. Clearly the parties have said different things, and the· 
was no mutual consent or meeting of the minds on this very essent 
element or term as required to form a binding contract. 17 Am Ju 
2d, Contracts §18, p. 354. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE TWO REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
RELATIVE TO THE REJECTION OF AN OFFER, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE 
iZEQl!r'STED TNSTRlJCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The following two requested instructions by Lewis were refused and 
not given by the Court to the Jury: 
The power of acceptance created by an of fer or counter-
offer is terminated by a communicated rejection. This is true 
even though a definite time was given by the offeror for consid-
ering his offer or counteroffer and the rejection is made 
before that time is expired. Likewise, this is true regardless 
of whether the of fer or counteroffer requires or does not 
require the acceptance to be made in writing. R. Vol II p. 256. 
and 
An offer or counteroffer once rejected is not subject to 
being accepted at a later date in the absence of the offer or 
counteroffer being renewed by the party making the same. 
R. Vol II p. 260. 
The law which Trees relied upon is already set forth above at page 
8 namely, Corbin on Contracts and the case of Treautwein vs. Leavy. 
Had these instructions been given, the jury would have had a basis 
to find that the Plaintiff had rejected the Counteroffer as argued 
in Point I. Such a finding would have eliminated any question for 
the jury relative to the May 29 letter. Lewis was prejudiced by 
the failure to give this instruction. There could be no finding of 
the jury on this point since it was not submitted by the Court, and 
it can be assumed that the Court did not concur with the instruction 
or the law supporting it since the failure to give this instruction 
was raised in the MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT, R. Vol. 3 
P. 196, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, R. Vol. 3 P. 264 and 
4FFIDAVIT attached thereto and DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, R. Vol. 3 p. 107. 
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The Requested Instruction relative to the Statute of Frauds 
An agreement pertaining to lane or an interest in land 
required to be in writing. If such agreement is not in writ 
it is void and of no force and effect. Statute of Frauds, U 
Code Annotated, Chapter 5 Title 25. R. Vol II 274 and 288. 
Under the terms of the Option Agreement, a Warranty Deed wai 
required to be delivered transferring title of the Ranch in feet 
Trees. As noted elsewhere, Trees did not want a cloud on his dee 
(title). However, Lewis was entitled to have "declared" his reta 
interest in the Ranch in written form, otherwise the Statute of 
Frauds would have prevented him from making any successful claim 
to his retained visitation rights, and the jury was entitled to s 
know, and question the motives of the Plaintiff and his position 
there was a mutual oral agreement for visitation rights. Oral 
visitation rights gave the plaintiff many advantages. 
The giving of each of these instructions could and would hav· 
resulted in the jury finding for Lewis. The errors are prejudici 
Webb vs. Snow 132 P.2d 114, 102 Utah 435. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THE AGREEM 
OF JUNE 19 and JUNE 23. 
The two Agreements signed by Snow as attorney-in-fact were a 
admitted into evidence because of the objection that they were 
offers of compromise. T Vol. II, commencing page 339. Before th 
objection in ruling, Trees had testified that he had always been 
willing to accept the Agreement of December 17. These letters we 
in direct contradiction to that statement and position. They wer 
signed by his attorney-in-fact and he was bound by them and he di 
not claim that they did not represent his point of view. There i 
_, /, ~ 
nothi11g in these Agreements which indicate that they are offers in 
Lumpronn:;,: tiley ,-,f,r"k fo1- themselves what Trees was willing to give 
tc LPwL b,- ,,,~-; nf -visitation. They represent the very tools of 
cross examination and the purpose of cross examination in finding 
uul the tn1th by pointing out the inconsistancies in prior statements 
of a witness a!ld generally impeach him. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE SURPRISE WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWING ATTORNEY SNOW TO TESTIFY AS TO 
INTENTION OF LETTER OF :1AY 29. 
On the second day of trial the Court permitted over the objection 
of Lewis, to permit the Plaintiff to waive his client-attorney 
relationship with Snow, so as to permit Snow to testify as to the 
intention of Trees and Snow relative to the May 29 letter in which 
Trees exercises his option under the contract. This action came as 
a complete surprise to Lewis who had not prepared for trial on 
that basis. The large record, transcript and numerous and long 
Depositions primarily resulted from the position taken by the 
Plaintiff that there was a contract and the option therein was 
exerc-ised by the letter of May 29, 1981, and the attempt by Defendant 
Lewis to determine how and in what manner the contract came about, 
how and in ,ihat manner the option came about, and how and in what 
manner the> cldirned option was exercised. The position of Lewis was 
alwavr; cle3r that there was a Counteroffer which was never accepted. 
Tc '-''3:~ ,:ut until rrial that the Defendant really acknowledged the 
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existance of a Counteroffer, and the claimed acceptance thereof. 
The COMPLAINT filed by Snow on July 29, 1981, makes no reference 
to a Counteroffer although the position of Lewis that a Countercf1 
had been made and withdrawn had been known to him in writing sine< 
June 12, 1981. The FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by a new at tom 
on April 30, 1982, contained fourteen counts and eighty-four para1 
all of which deal only with the December 4th option and none of wl 
makes reference of any kind to the December 17th Agreement. Only 
four paragraphs deal with the question of a Counterclaim and they 
are grudgingly conditional and read as follows: 
57. That in the event Defendant's position ob-
tained on advise from counsel that he had made a 
counteroffer is sustained, knowledge of such a position was 
conveyed only as of June 12, 1981. 
58. That even were the option dealt with as a counter· 
offer; 
(A) Plaintiff's failure to give reasonable, or for 
that matter any, notice of his rejection cf the same shortly 
after its execution on December 4, 1980 (Exhibit A) acts as 
an acceptance of the so-called counteroffer; indeed Plaintifl 
adopted a course of behavior indicating assent to such 
modification; and/or 
(B) Plaintiff at all times did accept the so called 
counteroffer; and/or 
(C) Plaintiff was, upon notific3tion of Defendant's 
election to designate the option as a counteroffer, not giver 
reasonable notice or indeed any notice or opportunity, to 
accept or reject the same. 
5g, Whether designated as an option or a counteroffer, 
Plaintiff has been and is ready, willing, and able to perfov 
his portion of the parties' agreement. 
Interrogatories were sent to Trees requesting in Interrogatory 
No. 15: "Please state all of the facts which you claim to support 
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tliP 3] I' .~H Lon:' to p:nagraph 58 B; designate each witness who will 
tP'r Lfy 1 n :·, ,. •.-t l hc-re0f and state the substance of the testimony 
•)l each w Ltness ThE: Answer sets forth no facts but merely states 
that the Plaintiff will rely upon the Depositions of Trees, Snow, 
Lewis and Milne together with a check. These Answers were filed 
and mailed De~ember 1, 1982, approximately two months before trial 
whi_ch commenced on February 9, 1983. In an almost identical request 
with regard to paragraph 59, the Plaintiff responded substantially 
the same way but referred to the facts set forth in Plaintiff's Pre-
Trial submitted to the Court on November 12, 1982. R Vol. 2 pg 7 & 
8. An Affidavit of the Plaintiff also filed November 12, sets that 
he has read the facts set forth in the Pre-Trial wherein he 
acknowledged having read the proposed pre-trial order and "to my 
satisfaction these are the facts in the case and I subscribe under 
oath to them." R Vol l p. 230. The proposed Pre-Trial Order 
referred to is found commencing on P. 235 of the same volume. The 
following facts are contained in the proposed Pre-Trial Order: 
That any alleged Counteroffer made by the Defendant was in fact 
accepted through performance (P 239); that Lewis had added to the 
December 4 Agreement visitation rights which rights had been orally 
discussed and previously agreed to between the parties (P 253); 
rhal Lewis .Jemanded in a telephone conversation that Trees provide 
him wi•h •write up of their agreement on visitation (P 261); that 
11 eP; 111di cated to Hatch that he would consider putting the oral 
<tg1-ec-,,·1c,11t into writing so long as it did not cloud the Deed (262); 
thR• Milne and Trees tried at least a dozen telephone calls to 
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Lewis even pleading with Lewis to tell them what he wanted relati 
to a write up with his visitation rights (262); that the first t~ 
the parties or their agents heard of the concept or word "Counter, 
was June 12, 1981 (263); that companion proposals to memorialize 
the visitation rights, were mailed by Milne to Lewis or: about Jun; 
At a hearing on November 12, 1982, an ORDER was entered by t! 
Court wherein all correspondence between attorney Snow and Trees 
was submitted to the Court in camera so that the Court could revi1 
those letters which may reflect in whole or part on the relations! 
of the attorney-in-fact so that the attorney-client privilege 
would be preserved. The client-attorney privilege was asserted ir 
the Deposition of Snow, dated October 28, 1981, at page 4, and th 
Deposition inquired only into Snow's activity as attorney-in-fact 
and did not inquire into matters claimed to be within the privil~ 
The matter of Snow's correspondence came before the Court based 01 
a Motion by the attorney for Lewis. The Order resulted from the 
hearing on November 12, 1982, and is dated by the Court "Nunc Pro 
Tune" on the 29th day of March, 1982, with the word "November" 
stricken out, but the certificate shows that it was mailed on the 
16th day of November, 1982. R. Vol II p. 48. There was never u 
claim or assertion prior to trial that the Plaintiff accepted the 
Counteroffer of the Defendant specifically including the Agreemen 
of December 17. However, based on the ruling of the Court, Snow 
was permitted to testify what was the intention and the conversat 
between him and the Plaintiff Trees relative to the claimed accep 
letter of May 29. Had that intention been disclosed by pleadings 
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or µreve11ted from being disclosed by virtue of the attorney-client 
relationship, the Defendant Lewis would certainly have explored the 
same. 
A case similar to the present one and which appears to be in 
point is that of Phipps vs. Sasser, 445 P.2d P. 624 (Washington) 
(1968). The Court had before it a Motion to depose Plaintiff's 
physician before trial, and Plaintiff had asserted the physician-
patient privilege. The Court upheld the lower Court which denied 
the Motion to take the Deposition. However, the Court opined 
at pages 628 and 629 the following: 
We would agree that whenever it does become apparent 
that the plaintiff must decide in favor of waiver, then 
that waiver should not be delayed until the trial itself. 
The plaintiff should not have the unfair tactical advantage 
of a trial waiver which almost invariably results in a 
continuance and, frequently, in the dismissal of the action 
and another trial. 
Certainly, at some stage in the pre-trial proceedings, 
the plaintiff must decide whether he is going to call his 
treating physician or physicians, and, if he is, then the 
defendant is entitled to know it in time to take the depostion 
of such physicians or physicians and prepare to meet their 
testimony. 
Our civil rules bear the same numbers as the federal 
rules, which we have adopted with few changes. The federal 
courts, operating under identical rules, seem to have had 
little difficulty in accelerating the waiver of privilege 
on a case-to-case basis without the necessity of a blanket 
waiver. 
This case would seem to be in league with the spirit of the 
fair play and interest of justice doctrine set down by this Court 
in, I_.__M. A. Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc. 404 P.2d 670 
(lltah) (1965) wherein there had been a failure to plead an affirma-
tive defense, but the lower Court permitted the defense to be 
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asserted but this Court noted: " ... If the interests of ju;;tic 
so require and th€ opposing party is given a fair opportunity to 
meet such a defense, the trial court may permit the issue to be 
tried . 11 As is shown above, Lewis had no fair opportunity 
to meet the tertimony of Snow because of the assertion of the 
attorney-client relationship, the pleadings, the failure to give 
any notice of such testimony although great effort was made to 
obtain the same, and objection was made at the time of the waiver 
the introduction of the evidence. Justice requires that Defendu 
Lewis be given the opportunity to take Snow's Deposition as to 
matters heretofore hidden and covered from the Defendant so that 
he may adequately prepare to meet the testimony in a New Trial. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
This point is based on the assumption for purposes of argumE 
that the Court may uphold the judgment of the lower Court. 
The Court granted that attorney's fee in the sum of Forty-
Five Thousand ($45,000.00) Dollars as a reasonable attorney's fm 
However, the Plaintiff had asked for a sum double that amount. 
cost of this trial and particularly attorney's fees on both side< 
are enormous because of the conduct of the Plaintiff as set for~ 
herein and particularly his change of position at trial in final 
'l 
announcing that he had accepted the Counteroffer of the Plainti~ E 
rather than insisting that there was a contract between the part· 
had been done prior thereto and as has been set forth above. Thi ti 
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w;1s no need for the amount of work and effort put into this case 
nor the waste of the Court's time. Had the Plaintiff originally 
come forth and said that he had accepted the Counteroffer, the 
issues would have been very limited and quickly tried following a 
short discovery. Instead, the Plaintiff makes light of the Counter-
offer theory, until trial, and suggests that it was a figment of 
the imagination of the attorney for Trees rather than looking at 
the facts to which it finally conceded in claiming to have accepted 
the Counteroffer. The fee is not reasonable. Reference is made to 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
.JUDGMENT RE; ATTORNEY'S FEES. R Vol. III commencing at page 235, 
which further sets forth the Defendant's position without enlarging 
this brief. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE FIFTH SPECIAL INTERROGATORY 
TO THE JURY. 
The Fifth Special Interrogatory reads as follows: 
S. " We, the jury duly empanelled in the above-
entitled case, find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that Exhibit 26 constituted a notice of 
default as provided for in Exhibit 5, and that the 
Plaintiff failed to cure or correct said default, 
and therefore find in favor the Defendant, Walter 
Lewis, on all issues." R. Vol II p 333. 
ti The Interrogatory was not necessary but was confusing and misleading. 
(ounsto I f,Jr the Defendant, in front of the jury, stipulated that 
f: Exh tbt t ?() which is the letter of June 12th wherein the Counteroffer 
t: is w i thdrA.wn never was intended to be a notice or a compliance of 
'hi the Default as provided for in Exhibit 5, the December 4th Agreement. 
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That had never been the position of Lewis. Such a position wouli 
have been contrary to the very existence of a counteroffer since 
would have recogni.z~d that the December 4th Option Agreement was 
binding contract &nd there could not have been an outstanding 
counteroffer to withdraw. The Affidavit of the Defendant's attor 
in connection with the Motion for a New Trial and deals with the 
circumstances surrounding the Special Interrogatory No. 5, commen 
at P. 272 R. Vol. III. Prior to the jury's leaving, Defe~dant's 
counsel approached the Bench together with Plaintiff's counsel an 
objected to the Interrogatory that it in affect dire~ted a verdic 
in favor of the Plaintiff and requested that the Interrogatory no 
be submitted. Within fifteen minutes after the jury left, Defend 
counsel again approached the Court together with Plaintiff's Gour. 
and requested that the Court withdraw from considerati.on of Inter 
rogatory No. Five. The matter was again taken up after the jury 
returned and further objection made and denied by the Court. T 
Vol. IV 730-735. This Interrogatory could not help but confuse 
the Jury for it suggested there was a contract that that Lewis' 
letter of June 12 may have attempted to comply with the Default 
Provision. The Jury had to be confused and the Defendants 
highly prejudiced. 
SUMMARY 
One might say, what is a 11 the fuss about since the Plaintii 
buyer is now willing to give to Lewis everything which Lewis 
requested including the visitation rights and per the December i; 
Agreernenl ln fact that attitude was pursued very heavily by the 
lower Court, never on record, in exploring settlement of this case 
to lhe point that counsel for Lewis felt he was being admonished by 
the Court for not pushing his client into a settlement. R. Vol III 
p. 9, 10. AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. The best answer is that given by Defendant Lewis in 
T, Vol III p, 643: 
... Well, Milne precipitating it and Trees disclaiming any 
responsibility for his agents, I told myself, 'Look, I'm too 
old for the rest of my life to put up with this kind of inter-
activity that was always leading -- keeping me on tenderhooks.' 
And I think it was at that time that I called the lawyer and 
decided that I'd better go in another direction. 
Defendant Lewis is still on "tenderhooks". This case was brought 
before this Court so that the law of contracts as pertains to this 
case could be firmly established to the end that Defendant would 
obtain the relief to which he is entitled. 
It is submitted that the Judgment and Decree of the lower 
Court be reversed and Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant 
Lewis, or, in the alternative, that this Court grant a new trial, a 
trial that would now be short and to the point. 
3~ 
Respectfully submitted this -2-fHl day of April, 1984. 
BELL & BELL, b\) 
./}/2Ui~ 
,V. Richard Be 11 
/Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
\ Walter Lewis 
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